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Abstract
In this paper we study learning procedures when counterfactuals (payo￿s of not-chosen
actions) are not observed. The decision maker reasons in two steps: First, she updates
her propensities for each action after every payo￿ experience, where propensity is de￿ned
as how much she prefers each action. Then, she transforms these propensities into choice
probabilities. We introduce natural axioms in the way propensities are updated and the
way propensities are translated into choice, and study the decision marker’s behavior
when such axioms are in place.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with learning by economic decision-makers who have to take
decisions in situations where little is known about the performance of each of the alternatives
available. For example, consider decisions such as how to conduct business negotiations, which
consumption goods to buy, and in which assets to invest our money. In many such situations,
we may not know how many di￿erent states of nature are possible, the probability distribution
over these states or the payo￿s associated with each alternative and state. Moreover, even if
all this information was available, processing it in order to make optimal choices may prove
overly complicated.
Traditional economic theory assumes that even in such situations agents act as if they
were maximizing expected utility with a unique subjective probability distribution (Savage,
1954 and Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). In situations like the ones described above it seems
unclear why expected utility maximization should be successful in predicting behavior well.
An alternative is to study models where agents arrive at their decisions by learning from their
own experiences or via communication with others 1. This is often done by either imposing
some optimality properties on the learning rule agents use or by simply positing an ad-hoc
model which seems a good description of actual behavior 2.
In this paper we take a somewhat di￿erent route. As in other learning models, we pro-
pose a setting where the decision maker evaluates the di￿erent alternatives according to the
payo￿s she obtained in the past. Instead of simply positing a model, though, we examine
the implications of some natural and simple requirements on how learning occurs. Unlike
in the literature on optimal learning, we do not impose any kind of optimality requirement
on way learning occurs via our axioms. As opposite to this, we try to ￿nd axioms which
characterize natural behavior in such situations. The only knowledge the decision maker has
in our setting is the set of available actions. She does not necessarily know about the state
space, the probability distribution over such state, or the payo￿ associated with each action
at a given state. Over time, the decision maker observes the payo￿ she obtains in every
period and uses that information for choosing next period.
Our approach is similar to Easley and Rustichini (1999). However, unlike them we assume
that the decision maker does not observe counterfactuals. That is, at any given period,
she does not observe the payo￿ of the actions she does not choose. This seemingly small
di￿erence has a big impact in the way the decision maker tackles the problem of learning:
If counterfactuals are observed, the action chosen is completely irrelevant for the learning
1Fudenberg and Levine (1998) have surveyed some of the vast literature on learning.
2Examples of the ￿rst class of models are B￿ orgers et al (2004) or Schlag (1998). Examples for the second
class are Roth and Erev (1995), Camerer and Ho (2004) among many others.
2process as the decision maker learns the same information independently on her choices. On
the other hand, if counterfactual are not observed, learning is crucially a￿ected by the action
chosen as the decision maker only learns about the actions she chooses.
Therefore, in an environment where counterfactuals are not observed, the decision maker
has a trade-o￿ between exploitation of the currently most preferred action and exploration
of the other alternatives3. The fact that counterfactuals are not observed, as we explain
below, gives rise to a separation between how much the decision maker prefers each action
and how these preferences translate into choices. Hence, the learning procedures we study
can be characterized through two processes: First, we have the updating rule. The updating
rule speci￿es how new information, experiences, etc. a￿ect the decision marker’s propensity
towards each of the possible actions. These propensities could represent beliefs about the
distribution of payo￿s associated with each action or a much wider set of feelings such as
con￿rmatory bias or forgetting. Secondly, there is the choice rule, which speci￿es how these
propensities are translated into actual choices.
As already mentioned, and quoting Easley and Rustichini (1999), \our interest is not
in the existence of a procedure that \works"". Hence, we do not make any requirement
regarding optimality from the learning rules ex ante, i.e. through our axioms. Instead, the
axioms we pose are meant to capture natural features on the agent’s behavior rather than
desirable properties of the learning rule. However, in a second step, we investigate how these
natural requirements relate to optimality.
In our results we also relate how the learning behavior induced by our axioms relates to
learning rules that are known in the literature. In particular, we show that under our main ax-
ioms the resulting learning procedure is a form of reinforcement learning which approximates
the replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory 4.
There have been other axiomatizations of learning procedures that lead to a behavior
that resembles replicator dynamics. To our knowledge, this has been the case mostly in
the literature on optimal learning with bounded rational agents (see, for example, B￿ orgers
et al (2004) and Schlag (1998) among others). Our approach is di￿erent in that we are
not interested in characterizing optimal rules. The only axiomatization of the replicator
dynamics using natural axioms is due to Easley and Rustichini (1999). However, and as
already mentioned, their paper deals with learning when counterfactuals are observed. In
section 6.3 we explain the di￿erences between Easley and Rustichini (1999) and our approach
in more detail.
3Even though we are dealing with a possibly bounded rational decision maker, the rational solution to such
a problem is also far from trivial (See e.g. Bergemann and Vaelimaeki, 2006).
4See Roth and Erev (1995), Bush and Mosteller (1951) or Sutton and Barto (1998).
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the learning environ-
ment. Section 3 introduces the axioms on the transition function and give a characterization
given such axioms. Section 4 proceeds likewise and a characterization of the choice function
is presented. In section 5, we establish e￿ciency and optimality results for the learning rules
resulting from our axioms. A relation between the replicator dynamics and the characteriza-
tions resulting from our axioms is presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a decision maker who at each period t = 0;1;::: chooses an action from the ￿nite
set A = f1;:::;ng . Every action yields a random payo￿ ￿ 2 ￿ = R+. Denote by ￿t
i the
realization of ￿ at time t of action i.
Denote by ￿ Ht = f￿ htgt￿1
￿=1 the set of all possible histories at t ￿ 1 with elements ￿ ht 2 A ￿
￿n = ￿ Ht and let ￿ H =
S
t￿1 ￿ Ht be the entire set of histories. Denote Ht;ht;H correspondingly
as the part of the history that is observed by the decision maker. The initial histories are
assumed to be empty ￿ H0;￿ h0 = ; and H0;h0 = ;. Finally, let ￿i
￿
ht￿
be the sum of payo￿s of





For any history ht denote by #i
￿
ht￿
the number of times action i is chosen in ht.
At each point in time the decision maker is assumed to have propensities ￿ 2 ￿ = Rn
+
where ￿i 2 ￿i is the propensity of action i 2 A and
Qn
i=1 ￿i = ￿. We use ￿t
i to denote the
propensity of action i at time t. The initial vector of propensities ￿0 2 ￿ is given. Propensities
can be interpreted as a numerical representation of preferences 5.
Since our agent does not observe counterfactuals, his choices matter crucially for learning.
In particular, it is not necessarily optimal for her to always choose the action with the highest
propensity (as it is the case under expected utility maximization) as this would preclude
learning about other actions. Hence, the agent randomizes his choice every period where the
probability of choosing each action is given by p : ￿ ! ￿n with p = (p1;:::;pn) where ￿n is
the n-dimensional unit simplex.
At the end of each period the decision maker observes the payo￿ of the action played
and updates her propensities ￿. Propensities over actions change according to the transition





is the new propensity of action i if





5Such numerical representation exist under expected utility maximization by the von Neumann-
Morgenstern theorem
4for all i 2 A when action j is chosen and payo￿ ￿t
j is obtained.
3 Axioms on Updating Rule T
As mentioned in the introduction, the decision maker separates her reasoning into two steps.
First, there are her propensities (￿), which tells us how much she prefers each action. Second,
we have her choices (p), which are simply an application from propensities into probabilities.
In this section we introduce a set of axioms on the way the propensities are updated. These
axioms are not motivated by optimality considerations but rather by behavioral rules of
thumb.
Our ￿rst axiom on the way propensities are updated deals with the fact that there is, a
priori, no reason why the decision maker would treat propensities di￿erently based only on
the label of the actions. This axiom embodies the requirement that the decision-maker should
not have preferences which do not stem from her own experience. It avoids all unreasonable
bias towards any action.











if and only if ￿i = ￿k and either j 6= i;k or j = i;k.
Requiring some kind of Anonymity is standard and can also be found in, for instance,
B￿ orgers et al (2004) or Easley and Rustichini (1999). The second axiom is a monotonicity
requirement. It implies that, all things equal, starting with a higher propensity results in a
higher propensity after the updating takes place. It also implies that, all things equal, higher
payo￿ translates into higher new propensity of the action chosen. Note that the axiom makes
claim between di￿erent actions. That is, it relates only the updating of the propensity of a
given action i with this same action’s propensity and payo￿ ￿i;￿i.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). The transition function Ti is strictly increasing in ￿i and ￿i.
Our third axiom deals with how big the changes in propensities can be. We assume the
decision maker updates propensities in a su￿ciently smooth way. In particular, we assume
that T is di￿erentiable with respect to initial propensities ￿ and payo￿ ￿. As an extension to
our main results, in section 3.1.1 we characterize the function T when di￿erentiability (nor
continuity) is not assumed. We choose to focus on di￿erentiability as the resulting function
T is more reasonable as it does not present any sudden changes in slope or jumps.
Axiom 3 (Di￿erentiability). The transition function T is di￿erentiable in ￿ and ￿.
5Our ￿nal axiom speci￿es how payo￿s are treated when updating propensities. The follow-
ing axiom states that, for any two possible histories that start with the same propensity for a
given action and where the number of times a given action has been played coincides across
these two histories, then the sum of payo￿s determines under which history the propensity
of the given axiom is higher. Note that the axiom makes no claim on: how to compare
propensities of di￿erent actions and, on how to compare the propensities under two di￿erent
histories where the given action has been played a di￿erent number of times or had di￿erent
initial propensity. Hence the term Weak.
Axiom 4 (Weak Sum). For any histories ht and ￿ hk and any action i, T is such that if
￿0







i ￿ ￿ ￿k






The aim of this paper is to understand learning without counterfactuals when natural
axioms are in place. We are aware that \natural" is an, at most, vague term. Therefore,
considering alternatives to our main axioms is an important part of our article. In section
3.1 we consider other alternatives to the axioms presented above.
We move now to present a characterization on the way propensities are updated given
the four axioms above. Our ￿rst result is that if an action is not chosen, then its propensity
does not change. This is a consequence of the Weak Sum axiom.
Lemma 1. Given any transition T that satis￿es Weak Sum, we have that ￿t+1
i = Ti(￿t;j;￿j)
for any ￿t, j 6= i and ￿j.
Proof. Fix the initial propensities ￿t. Assume action i is not played at time t. Consider the
alternative event (history) where action i is played at time t. Weak Sum implies that ￿t+1
i = ^ ￿t
i
where ^ ￿ indicates the value of ￿ under the alternative history. Since, by construction, ￿t
i = ^ ￿t
i,
we can conclude that ￿t+1
i = ￿t
i. Thus, we have that the propensity of an action only changes
if that action is played.
The next result states that the propensity of a given action is not a￿ected by the propen-
sities of the other actions. That is, propensities are updated independently across action.
This results is again a consequence of the Weak Sum axiom.
Lemma 2. Assume that T satis￿es Weak Sum. For any pair ￿i;￿ we have that Ti (￿;i;￿),
where ￿i is an element of ￿, is independent of ￿￿i.
Proof. By Weak Sum T, is such that starting from any ￿t and for any two histories ht+m
and ^ ht+m with m 2 n+ that are di￿erent only in the periods where action i is not chosen,
the value of ￿t+m
i equals the value of ^ ￿t+m
i . Thus, the propensities of all actions ￿i do not
in￿uence the propensity of action i and, hence, the function Ti does not depend on ￿￿i.
6We are ￿nally able to present a characterization of the transition function T. Proposition
1 below states that the way propensities are updated is linear in payo￿s. The results is a
consequence of lemmas 1 and 2 above and axioms 1-4.
Proposition 1. A transition T satis￿es axioms 1- 4 if and only if for all i 2 A there exists





i + ￿￿ + ￿ if action i is played and payo￿ ￿ is obtained,
￿t
i otherwise.
Note that the expression above has two free parameters: ￿ and ￿. The parameter ￿
represents how payo￿s increase propensities while the parameter ￿ acts as a counter on how
many times an action has been played.
Proof. First note that by Lemma 2 we can ￿nd a function gi : ￿i ￿ ￿ that represents Ti for
all i 2 A. That is, for all ￿ 2 ￿, i 2 A, ￿ 2 ￿ we have that
gi (￿i;￿) = Ti (￿;i;￿)
where ￿i is an element of ￿.
Take any two payo￿s ^ ￿; ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ and consider the following two histories:
h2 = ((i; ^ ￿);(i; ￿ ￿));
^ h2 = ((i; ￿ ￿);(i; ^ ￿)):
By Weak Sum we have that ￿2 = ^ ￿2. Thus, using the de￿nition of g we have that for any
￿i 2 ￿i and any ^ ￿; ￿ ￿ 2 ￿
gi (gi (￿i; ^ ￿); ￿ ￿) = gi (gi (￿i; ￿ ￿); ^ ￿): (1)
Furthermore, Weak Sum implies that for all ￿;" > 0
gi (gi (￿i; ^ ￿) + ￿; ￿ ￿) = gi (gi (￿i; ￿ ￿) + ￿; ^ ￿);
gi (gi (￿i; ^ ￿); ￿ ￿ + ") = gi (gi (￿i; ￿ ￿); ^ ￿ + "):

























7for all ￿i 2 ￿i and ~ ￿; ￿ ￿ 2 ￿.





















































for all ￿i; ^ ￿; ￿ ￿. Therefore, using (3) and the fact that g is di￿erentiable by Di￿erentiability,
















Since this is true for any ￿i; ^ ￿; ￿ ￿, we have that
gi (￿i;￿) = ￿i + f(￿) (7)
for some strictly increasing (Axiom 2) and everywhere di￿erentiable (Axiom 3) function
f : ￿ ! ￿. But by equation (6) we must have that
f (￿) = ￿￿ + ￿: (8)
for some ￿ and ￿. By Monotonicity we have that ￿ > 0, and by the fact that propensities
are de￿ned in R+, ￿ ￿ 0. Combining (7), (8) and Lemma 1 gives the desired result.
3.1 Discussion on the Axioms of T
3.1.1 Di￿erentiability
The di￿erentiability axiom has been assumed as it seems natural that the decision maker
would want to update propensities in a su￿ciently smooth way. However, one might argue
8that this may not necessarily be the case. We now deal with how the decision maker updates
propensities when there is no assumption regarding the smoothness of T. The following result
has an answer:
Proposition 2. A transition T satis￿es axioms 1, 2 and 4 if and only if for all i 2 A and
almost all ￿t





i + ￿￿ + ￿ when i is played and ￿ is obtained,
￿t
i otherwise
for ￿ 2 B" (0).
Proof. A known result is that any monotone function is almost everywhere di￿erentiable (see,
for example, Theorem 14a in Chabrillac and Crouzeix (1987)). Thus, since T is monotonous,
it is almost everywhere di￿erentiable. Once this fact is established, the rest of the proof is a
straightforward extension to the proof of Proposition 1.
If di￿erentiability is not assumed, then the functional form in Proposition 1 is still valid
for small neighborhoods of given propensities. However, the functional form of T for a given
neighborhood of ￿;￿ may not be valid for the entire ￿ ￿ ￿ space. It may happen that T is









i + ￿1￿ if ￿t




i + ￿1￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿2
￿1 + ￿ if ￿t
i < ￿ and ￿t
i + ￿1￿ ￿ ￿;
￿t
i + ￿2￿ otherwise
for some ￿1;￿2;￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0.
It is easy to check that the transition T represented above satis￿es axioms 1, 2 and 4 but
it doesn’t satisfy Di￿erentiability (T is not even continuous at ￿ = ￿). In this case, each
payo￿ ￿ increases the propensity of its respective action by ￿￿ where the value of ￿ is not
constant throughout the whole ￿ ￿ ￿ space. The transition T is has also a discontinuity at
￿ = ￿ where propensities are increased by ￿. We choose to avoid such non-smooth behavior
by assuming the transition T to be di￿erentiable.
3.1.2 Weak Sum
The Weak Sum axiom has the feature that all payo￿s are treated equally independently on
when they happened. Thus, a t-period old payo￿ a￿ects propensities in the same way as a
9payo￿ obtained in the present period. In this subsection we consider an alternative to the




as the discounted sum of payo￿s of action i in history ht where each payo￿
is discounted at the rate of ￿ 2 (0;1) per period. Thus, a t-period old payo￿ of ￿ equals to a
payo￿ of ￿t￿ today. An alternative to Weak Sum is the following:
Axiom’ 1 (Weak Weighted Average). For any histories ht and ￿ ht and any action i, T is
such that if ￿0







i ￿ ￿ ￿t






for some ￿ 2 (0;1).
Note that two histories can be compared using the Weak Weighted Average only if they
are the same length as otherwise it can be shown that no transition T exists (see Appendix
8.1.2). If we replace the Weak Sum axiom with the Weak Weighted Average axiom we obtain
the following result (proof in Appendix 8.1.1):
Proposition 3. If transition T satis￿es axioms 1-3 and 1’ then for all i 2 A there exists a





i + ￿￿ + ￿ if action i is played and payo￿ ￿ is obtained,
￿￿t
i + ￿ otherwise.
Note that the functional form of the transition Ti in this case has three free parameters:
￿, ￿ and ￿.
The Weak Weighted Average is not the only reasonable alternative to the Weak Sum
axiom. So far we have assumed that the decision maker has no concern about risk, that is,
we have taken her to be risk neutral. A natural alternative to this is to consider a risk averse
decision maker. In particular, we could assume that the decision maker attitude towards risk
is lexicographic in the sum of payo￿ and variance of payo￿s. That is,
Axiom’ 2 (Risk Averse Sum). For any histories ht and ￿ hk and any action i, T is such that
if ￿0












i > ￿ ￿k






i ￿ ￿ ￿k










One can show, however, that there exists no transition T satisfying axioms 1-3 and 2’ (see
Appendix 8.1.3). An alternative way of treating risk could be assuming the decision maker
treats sum of payo￿s and variance as substitutes. This would imply that she is willing to
give up higher payo￿s in favor of less variance. However, an axiom targeting a representation
of such behavior is troublesome. In particular, it is not clear what is the natural way of
exchanging risk into payo￿ and vice versa.
104 Axioms on Choice Function p
We proceed now to study how propensities are translated into choices. How the decision
maker chooses between each of the available actions is crucial for the learning process as the
only way the decision maker can gain information about an action is by choosing it.
Our ￿rst two axioms are equivalent to the Anonymity and Monotonicity axioms for T.
As for the transition functions, Anonymity implies that all actions are given equal treatment
in the sense that their label does not matter. Monotonicity means that, other things equal,
the decision maker tends to assign more probability to the action she prefers more. That is,
higher propensities implies higher probability.
Axiom 5 (Anonymity). The choice rule p does not depend on actions per se.
Axiom 6 (Monotonicity). Each choice function pi is strictly increasing in ￿i for all i 2 A.
Our third axiom, Continuity, relates to how smooth Behaviour is. In particular, Conti-
nuity means that there are no discrete jumps in how propensities are translated into choices.
Later in section 4.1.1 we discuss what are the implications of dropping the Continuity axiom.
Axiom 7 (Continuity). Each choice function pi is continuous in ￿.
The ￿nal axiom relates to how the relative di￿erences in propensities are translated into
relative di￿erences in choice probabilities. Boundedness means that the decision maker should
not exaggerate the relative di￿erences in propensities when translating these into choices.
This has the natural interpretation that the decision maker is always inclined to \try" the
di￿erent actions, albeit with small probability, even if the propensities of these actions is low.
We believe that in an environment where counterfactuals are not observed such cautiousness
or willingness to investigate is reasonable. In section 4.1.2 we prove that Boundedness can
be thought as a consequence of another two axioms that we introduce later: Independence
and Lipschitz Continuity.





< ￿ for some ￿ > 0 then
pi
pj < ￿ij￿.
In other words, Boundedness states that if the relative propensities of two actions are
bound by some number ￿ 2 R, then relative choice probabilities should be bound by a ￿nite
(but possibly arbitrarily large) multiple of ￿. Hence, the requirement is that the decision
maker does not ever fully discard an action given current propensities. However, she may
assign an arbitrarily small probability to some actions. Hence, loosely speaking, the require-
ment is to be at least "a bit cautious".
11Our ￿rst result states that the probability of choosing each action negatively depends on
the propensities of the other actions. Given Monotonicity and Anonymity, the result is due
to the fact that the choice probabilities must lie in the n-dimensional unit simplex.
Lemma 3. If p satis￿es Anonymity and Strict Monotonicity then for all i 2 A we have that
pi is strictly decreasing in ￿k, 8k 6= i.
Proof. Since
P
pi = 1 and since pk is strictly increasing in ￿k, at least some pj 6= pk has to
be strictly decreasing in ￿k. But then by Anonymity this has to be true for all pj.
Next we show that if an action has a greater propensity than another action, then the
probability of choosing it must also be greater. This result is again a consequence of Mono-
tonicity and Anonymity.













where the ￿rst argument is the value of ￿ for action i, the second argument for action j and
the third argument the value of ￿ for all other actions. Now by Strict Monotonicity and
























We are now able to provide a characterization of the choice probabilities p. The class of
rules satisfying Anonymity, Monotonicity and Continuity is quite large. The Boundedness
axiom, however, turns out to induce a unique characterization. Proposition 4 below states
that the probability of choosing each action is linearly proportional to its propensity.





Proof. First we show necessity. It is obvious that pi = ￿i P
j ￿j satis￿es Strict Monotonicity and










= ￿￿, 8￿ > 1. Next we show su￿ciency.









































































holds true 8i;j 2 A




























i = 1. But now if ￿min > 1; then 9￿
00











. This also implies (since
P








j;8j 6= i. Now since pi(￿) is continuous and mapping ￿ into [0;1] then (by Anonymity and
monotonicity) it follows that 9^ ￿ s.t. 8￿i > ^ ￿ : pi >
￿00￿i P
j ￿j









i > 1: (14)
what contradicts p being a probability. Hence we need ￿min = 1. But then
P








4.1 Discussion on the Axioms of p
4.1.1 Continuity
What happens if we do not require the continuity axiom, i.e. if we allow the agent to respond to
small changes in propensities with "big" changes in choice probabilities? Without Continuity,
another class of rules is possible, such as, for example, the following: Denote by ￿max the
maximum of f￿1;:::;￿ng and de￿ne pi as follows:
pi =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0:9 if ￿maxis unique and ￿i = ￿max
(0:1)￿i P
￿j6=￿max ￿j
if ￿maxis unique but ￿i 6= ￿max
￿i P
j ￿j
if ￿maxis not unique
6Assume there existed an interval [ e ￿ ￿ x; e ￿ + x] s.t. 8e ￿ + x > ￿j > e ￿ : pj <
￿j P
￿h and 8e ￿ ￿ x < ￿i < e ￿ :
pi >
￿i P
￿h, then lim￿i;￿j!e ￿
pj






h6=j ￿h+￿j) = 1 which contradicts Strict Monotonicity (using
Lemma 4). Note also that the limit exists by continuity
13The rule above satis￿es Strict Monotonicity and Anonymity and also the Boundedness











< 9(jAj ￿ 1)￿
whenever
￿i
￿j < ￿ and hence the axiom holds for ￿ = 9(jAj ￿ 1). (If ￿i 6= ￿max; then the axiom
holds for ￿ = 1).
4.1.2 Boundedness
Essentially, the Boundedness axiom rules out choice rules where "too little" exploration is
performed. The simple choice rule where the action with the highest propensity is chosen with
probability one or the exponential choice rule are two examples of rules where the decision
maker converges to a single action quickly without exploring the environment. Obviously,
without the Boundedness axiom the class of admissible choice rules is massive.
One may wonder why we do not assume Lipschitz continuity instead of the Boundedness
axiom. Next we look at the relationship between the Boundedness axiom and Lipschitz
continuity. The ￿rst thing to note is that Lipschitz continuity does not imply the Boundedness








j ￿j : This function
is Lipschitz continuous for ￿ = 3 (since (pi ￿ pj) = 3
2
P
j ￿j (￿i ￿ ￿j)), but it does not satisfy
the Boundedness axiom. Note that this rule is also Anonymous and Monotone.
The example presented in subsection 4.1.1 has already shown that it is also not the case
that Boundedness implies Lipschitz continuity. Furthermore, Boundedness and Continuity
are also not enough to imply Lipschitz continuity. Consider a the following axiom





















Clearly this axiom is weaker than Boundedness and is, for example, satis￿ed by the
exponential choice rule (in conjunction with the other axioms). What about, though, if we
require both Independence and Lipschitz continuity? The following proposition shows that
taken together these axioms are stronger than the Boundedness axiom.
Proposition 5. Any choice rule satisfying Independence and Lipschitz continuity also sat-
is￿es Boundedness.
Proof. Note ￿rst that independence requires that
pi
pj is not a function of ￿k for any k 6= i;j.
Furthermore we know by Rademacher’s theorem that every Lipschitz continuous function is
14almost everywhere di￿erentiable. Now taking the partial derivative of
pi
pj with respect to ￿k








;8k 6= j;i: (15)
Thus, all we need to show is that there is a constant bounding the RHS of equation (15).









L which implies that every partial derivative must be bound by a constant and hence also the
RHS of equation (15). Now assume that the derivative
@pi
@￿j fails to exist on some set C ￿ ￿.
It should be easy to see that the above arguments still apply.
Hence, Boundedness is implied by Independence and Lipschitz continuity taken together
while the reverse is not true. Note that Lipschitz continuity also implies Continuity, but
even if we take Continuity and Boundedness together they do not imply Lipschitz continuity.
Our example in subsection 4.1.1 above violated Continuity. Next we present an example of
a rule which satis￿es Boundedness and Continuity but violates Lipschitz continuity. Note
that any such example must violate either Anonymity or Strict Monotonicity since the only
rule satisfying all four of these is the rule from Proposition 4 which is Lipschitz continuous.








j ￿j if i 6= 1
Clearly this rule satis￿es Continuity and Boundedness. To see that it violates Lipschitz
continuity, note that






Hence, we have seen that requiring Lipschitz continuity and Independence together is a
stronger requirement than Continuity and Boundedness. As a matter of fact, Continuity and
Boundedness together do not even imply Lipschitz continuity. This should have convinced
the reader that our Boundedness axiom is relatively weak. 7
7One could also consider a stronger version of Lipschitz continuity which is sometimes called Bi-Lipschitz.
A function is Bi-Lipschitz if there exists ￿ such that 8i;j :
1
￿ j￿i ￿ ￿jj ￿ jpi ￿ pjj ￿ ￿j￿i ￿ ￿jj. This could be
interpreted as saying that choice probabilities should not be too far nor too close together. The condition again
is not implied by Boundedness. The proportional choice rule for example violates it since jpi ￿ pjj = j￿i￿￿jj
P
j ￿j ,
but no ￿ can be found which bounds
P
j ￿j.
155 E￿ciency and Optimality
5.1 E￿ciency
As we mentioned in the introduction, our target is not to axiomatize learning procedures
that \work". Instead, our aim is to provide a characterization of learning rules that satisfy
certain natural axioms. A question that arises once such characterization is carried out is
then: do the procedures that satisfy natural axioms work? This is the target to be studied
in this subsection.
We say that a transition function T together with a choice function p is e￿cient if it
selects the action with highest average payo￿ in the long run. Let E (￿i) be the expected
payo￿ of action i at any random period. We have then the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 1. A pair of transition function together with a choice function, (T;p), is e￿cient





Our next result shows that indeed the natural axioms we placed do make the decision
maker to select the e￿cient action in the long run. Proposition 6 below is a consequence of our
characterization and Rustichini’s (1998) result on linear procedures without counterfactuals 8.
Proposition 6. A pair (T;p) that satis￿es axioms 1-4 and 5-8 is e￿cient.











j + ￿j (ht)
￿ (16)

















j + ￿j (ht) + #j(ht)￿
￿
for some ￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0.
8Rustichini (1998) refers to the situation where counterfactuals are not observed as the partial information
case.
16Consider now a di￿erent environment where we multiply times ￿ all the payo￿s of all
actions and add ￿ to them. It is clear that in this new environment propensities and payo￿s
still belong to R+, so our characterization (propositions 1 and 4) can be applied. It is also
easy to see that for the new environment, argmax i ^ E (￿i) = argmaxi E (￿i), where ^ E denotes
the expected payo￿ in the modi￿ed environment.
Thus, Rustichini’s result implies that (16) puts probability 1 to action k in the limit in














j + ^ ￿j (ht)
￿
= 1
where ^ ￿ denotes the payo￿ in the modi￿ed environment.








































j + ￿j (ht) + #j(ht)￿
￿
= 1:
That is, the learning procedure that satis￿es axioms 1-8 chooses action k in the limit in
the original environment. Since k is the e￿cient action in the original environment, the result
follows.
5.2 Optimality
There is a sense in which the Boundedness axiom could be interpreted as the agent being
cautious in that she small di￿erences in propensities do not translate into large di￿erences in
choice. A more standard interpretation of being cautious may be that the choice functions
should be Lipschitz continuous as mentioned above. We now take up this de￿nition of being
’cautious’ and show that the proportional choice rule is optimal among all ’cautious’ (i.e. Lip-
schitz continuous) rules. This result will give us clearer interpretation of what Boundedness
adds over Lipschitz continuity. Consider ￿rst the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2. We say choice rule p is more cautious than choice rule p0 if 8i;jand￿i 6= ￿j :
￿(￿i;￿j) ￿ ￿0(￿i;￿j) where ￿ij := ￿(￿i;￿j) :=
pi￿pj
￿i￿￿j .
17There are several things worth noticing about this de￿nition: First, unlike the Bound-
edness axiom (and in the de￿nition of Lipschitz Di￿erentiability) ￿ can depend on ￿ and is
allowed to be in￿nite. Second, we can set ￿ii = 1 for simplicity, which will not a￿ect any of
our results. We also need ￿ij = ￿ji (which follows immediately from self-consistency).
Remark The proportional choice rule pi = ￿i P
j ￿j can be interpreted as the least cautious
rule, which is Lipschitz continuous and satis￿es Anonymity and Strict Monotonicity.









j is maximal if ￿t












￿￿1 which is exactly the parameter from the proportional choice rule. Hence, this
suggests that we could replace the Boundedness axiom above with Lipschitz continuity and
then single out from the remaining set of possible rules the ones which are "least cautious"
according to the de￿nition above.
Next we look at optimality properties to see how being cautious matters in terms of the
probability of choosing the e￿cient action. Denote by i￿ the e￿cient action (and assume for
now that it is unique) and by ￿e
i the expected payo￿ of action i at any given period. For
simplicity, consider choice rules that are di￿erentiable everywhere. Then we can state the
following result:
Proposition 7. Consider choice rules where
@￿ij(t)
@t ￿ 0 and assume that at t = 0 all actions
are chosen with the same probability. Then, there exists t such that for all t > t : pt
i￿ ￿ p0t
i￿
whenever p is less cautious than p0.






































































i ￿ (1 ￿ pt￿1
i )
￿
















9Note that we have assumed for simplicity that e ￿ = 0.
18Taking the continuous time limit we can write
￿
pi = ￿(pi￿ij￿e



































dt =: A(t) we can write the solution
to (17) as








where c stands for a constant that depends on the initial condition pi(0). This equation














(decreasing step sizes) and (ii) whenever t is "su￿ciently" large. Note that condition (i) is
satis￿ed whenever the associated choice rule is Lipschitz continuous.
Furthermore, note that those functions ￿ij(￿i;￿j) satisfying
@￿ij(t)
@t ￿ 0 do have a supremum
in ￿ since @￿i
@t ￿ 0;8i.
We are interested in how pi(t) varies with ￿ij. Since we say a rule is more cautious than
another rule whenever ￿ij < ￿0
ij;8i;j and 8￿i 6= ￿j we can replace each function ￿ij by its

















































































Hence the probability to choose i increases with ￿ if and only if action i is optimal, i.e.
yields higher payo￿s in expectation and if initial conditions are not too biased against it. It
should also be clear that the proof goes through (with heavier notation) if there are more
than two actions, but if i is uniquely optimal.
19If i is optimal and initial conditions are not too biased against it, then being less cautious
(higher ￿) is always better among Lipschitz continuous rules. This is intuitive, because if
initially the optimal action is chosen with very small probability, then it is optimal to be
more cautious, i.e. to explore also actions which have initially low propensities (and hence
probabilities) more. If initial propensities towards all actions are approximately the same,
then it is best to be least cautious within the bounds of Lipschitz continuity.
Note that our optimality result is quite revealing. We already know from section 5.1 that
the updating and choice rule derived from our main axioms are e￿cient in the sense that they
yield the optimal action in the long run. What the previous proposition shows is that the
the rule from axioms 1-8 yields higher expected payo￿s than any other Lipschitz continuous
rule after some ￿nite time10.
Proposition 7 also implies that the behavior of the decision maker under axioms 1-8 also
has a justi￿cation in terms of optimality among Lipschitz continuous rules: as we have seen,
it is the least cautious rule which satis￿es Anonymity and Strict Monotonicity.
Axioms 5-8 seem to yield the optimal level of ’cautiousness’ in choice. What if we do
not restrict to Lipschitz continuous rules? Is it still better to be less cautious? The answers
is negative. Note that if we do not restrict to Lipschitz continuous rules, the least cautious
rule is always the rule that chooses the action with the highest propensity with probability
one. Clearly this cannot be optimal, since it implies choosing the action that initially has the
highest propensity forever.11
It should also be made clear that no non-anonymous rules may do better (unless the
decision maker has some ex ante knowledge about which action is best, which is something
we rule out). By the same token, there can also be no rule which is anonymous but not
monotonic, since this (together with our updating rule) would imply that for some range of
￿ higher payo￿s lead to lower probabilities which is not optimal. Overall, hence, axioms 5-8
lead to a rule that yields the optimal level of caution among Lipschitz continuous rules.
6 Relation to Other Procedures and Further Discussion
6.1 Replicator Dynamics
Adapting the results from Hopkins (2002) or B￿ orgers and Sarin (1996) it is easy to show that
the behavior resulting from axioms 1-8 approximates the Replicator Dynamics in the long
10More precisely, it will attach a higher probability to the action with higher expected value.
11Even with an updating rule that allows for decreasing propensities, though, this choice rule does generally
not lead to the optimal action as has been shown by Sarin and Vahid (1999).
20run. Thus, in this respect we provide an axiomatization to the replicator dynamics.
Proposition 8. A pair (T;p) that satis￿es axioms 1-4 and 5-8 creates a sequence of choices
that can be approximated, in the sense of stochastic approximation, by the replicator dynamics.




































































Taking the continuous time limit of the last equation and neglecting the term of order
(
P
￿j)￿2 we get the evolutionary Replicator Dynamics. We are allowed this since by Proposi-
tion 1 all ￿i are strictly increasing and hence the property of decreasing step sizes is satis￿ed.
(See e.g. Hopkins, 2002).
6.2 Separation between Updating and Choice Rule
In a sense the separation between updating and choice rule is a classical separation in Eco-
nomics. In standard decision theory, options are evaluated by assigning probabilities to
di￿erent events. These probabilities then imply some (expected) levels of utility of the dif-
ferent options. The choice rule then simply prescribes to choose the option with the highest
evaluation (assigned utility value). However, if there is not enough information about states,
outcomes etc. then typically it will not be optimal to choose the option with the highest
valuation with probability one. This is the case since one should explore the state space and
learn about other options.
All classical learning rules do have this separation in a more or less explicit manner as
well. In (stochastic) ￿ctitious play, players update their beliefs about the choices of others,
which translates into an update about the expected pro￿tability of actions via an updating
rule, and then choose the action they assign the highest expected payo￿ to. Similarly, a
Bayesian learner will update her beliefs about the world using Bayes rule as an updating
rule and then choose whichever option seems best given the updated beliefs. This separation
seems implicit in any learning rule.
If the decision maker observes information about counterfactuals after each choice, then
her decisions become irrelevant for the learning process because her information at the end
of a period is independent of the action she chose. Hence, she can simply choose the action
21for which she has the highest propensity (preference). As mentioned several times, this is the
main di￿erence between our approach and the approach of Easley and Rustichini (1999).
If agents do not observe counterfactuals, such a separation is needed. One may suggest a
di￿erent approach where one imposes that the action with the highest propensity is chosen
with probability one and tries to include the exploitation/exploration trade-o￿ in the way
propensities are formed. Such an approach will fail in the following sense: either propensities
will have to be non-monotonous in payo￿s, in which case clearly convergence to the optimal
action will not occur, or an agent can get stuck with a suboptimal action if all actions tried
previously have led to lower payo￿s (See e.g. Sarin and Vahid, 1999). I our view, these two
failures require a quite unreasonable decision-maker.
6.3 Further Comparison with Literature
Let us compare our axioms with those of Easley and Rustichini (1999). Their most signif-
icant axioms are Symmetry, Monotonicity, Independence and Exchangeability. Symmetry
and Monotonicity are similar to our axioms of Anonymity and Monotonicity. Weak Sum
is comparable to Exchangeability but somewhat weaker. Exchangeability requires that past
and current payo￿s have the same e￿ects. Weak Sum requires that everything else equal
(i.e. given two histories of the same length where the action in question was chosen equally
often) the action should have a higher propensity if the sum of payo￿s under one history is
larger than under the other. Clearly, this implies that past and current payo￿s have the same
e￿ect. Furthermore, note that Proposition 3 shows that Weak Sum can be weakened without
fundamentally altering the results.
6.4 Discussion - Allowing for negative propensities
What if some propensities could be negative? This might lead to conceptual mistakes as it is
not necessarily true that agents treat negative propensities the same as positive propensities.
In order to circumvent this a possible approach is to normalize propensities according to some
function. Note that this would require extra assumptions on the normalization function. Now
we suggest a possible normalization.
For any t we order all ￿t
i from smallest to largest and denote by ￿t
(k) the k￿th smallest
￿t
i. Then we can de￿ne the following normalization recursively.
￿0t


















￿ ￿ = ￿t
(3) ￿ ￿t
(1):::
22Note that this normalization is the only possible normalization which (i) respects cardinal
di￿erences in propensities and (ii) is minimally distortive in the sense that the sum of changes
made to all the ￿i is minimal. However, the normalization above is arbitrary, this is why we
chose to deal with positive payo￿s only.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a model where a decision maker, oblivious of the environment she lives
in, learns about the payo￿ of the alternative options by own experience when counterfactuals
are not observed. The reasoning process of the decision maker was separated into two parts:
First, she has propensities over action. These represent her preferences for the di￿erent
alternatives and are based on her past experiences. Second, the decision maker then translates
these propensities into choice, the source of her experiences.
We established natural axioms in the way propensities are updated and the way propensi-
ties are translated into choice and characterized the behavior of the decision maker. Further-
more, we considered alternatives to our main axioms and studied the e￿ciency and optimality
of the learning procedures resulting from our axioms. Finally, we related our results to known
leading rules in the literature providing, for instance, an axiomatization of the replicator dy-
namics.
This paper targeted covering the gap in the literature whereby learning without counter-
factuals had only been studied from the optimality point of view. We posed natural axioms
and characterized behavior. The approach we followed had only been used so far in situations
where counterfactuals are observed.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs and Extra Results on Propensities
8.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3
First note that Lemma 2 is still valid under Weak Weighted Average. Thus, we can ￿nd a
function gi : ￿i ￿ ￿ that represents Ti for all i 2 A.
24Take any two payo￿s ^ ￿; ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ and consider the following two histories:
h2 = ((i; ^ ￿);(i;￿￿ ￿));
^ h2 = ((i; ￿ ￿);(i;￿^ ￿)):
By Weak Weighted Sum we have that ￿2 = ^ ￿2. Thus, using the de￿nition of g we have
that for any ￿i 2 ￿i and any ^ ￿; ￿ ￿ 2 ￿
gi (gi (￿i; ^ ￿);￿￿ ￿) = gi (gi (￿i; ￿ ￿);￿^ ￿): (23)







Since this is true for any ￿i; ^ ￿; ￿ ￿, we have that
gi (￿i;￿) = ￿￿i + f(￿) (24)
for some strictly increasing (Axiom 2) and everywhere di￿erentiable (Axiom 3) function
f : ￿ ! ￿.
Proceeding again as in the proof of Proposition 1 we can show that
f (￿) = ￿￿ + ￿: (25)
for some ￿ and ￿. By Monotonicity we have that ￿ > 0, and by the fact that propensities
are de￿ned in R+, ￿ ￿ 0. Combining (24), (25) and Lemma 1 gives the desired result.
8.1.2 A Variation of the Weak Weighted Average Axiom
Consider the following variation of the Weak Weighted axiom:
Axiom’ 4 (Weak Weighted Average 2). For any histories ht and ￿ hk and any action i, T is
such that if ￿0







i ￿ ￿ ￿k







The only di￿erence between the Weak Weighted Average axiom and the alternative above
lies in the fact that under the original Weak Weighted Average axioms the two histories that
are compared must have the same length. A consequence of this is that under Weak Weighted
Average’ a payo￿ obtained at the same point in time is treated di￿erently when comparing
histories of di￿erent lengths. That is, assume any histories with di￿erent lengths ht and ￿ hk
with k < t. If under both histories a payo￿ ￿ is obtained at time l < k then in history ￿
￿
ht￿
the payo￿ ￿ is discounted by ￿t￿l while in ￿
￿￿ hk￿
the payo￿ is discounted by ￿k￿l.
25Proposition 9. There exists no transition T that satis￿es axioms 1-3 and 4’.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Since axiom 1’ follows from axiom 4", we can use the





i + ￿￿ + ￿ if action i is played and payo￿ ￿ is obtained,
￿￿t
i + ￿ otherwise.
Take any ￿0







^ h1 = ((i;￿￿)):
By Weak Weighted Average axiom 2 we have that ￿2
i = ^ ￿1. Thus, using the result from
Proposition 3 we have that
￿2￿0
i + ￿￿ + 2￿ = ￿￿0
i + ￿￿ + ￿:
Therefore,
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿0
i:
Which contradicts the fact that ￿0
i 6= ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). The key argument is that ￿ and ￿ are
exogenous constants and their value cannot depend on ￿0
i.
8.1.3 Risk Averse Sum Axiom
Proposition 10. There exists no transition T that satis￿es axioms 1-3 and 2’.
Proof. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1 we can show that there must exist a








for all ￿i;￿. Furthermore, we can show that
gi (￿i;￿) = ￿i + f(￿) (27)
for some strictly increasing (Axiom 2) and everywhere di￿erentiable (Axiom 3) function
f : ￿ ! ￿.
26Take again any ^ ￿; ￿ ￿. By Risk Averse Sum we have that
f (^ ￿) + f (￿ ￿) > f (0) + f (^ ￿ + ￿ ￿):















However, this contradicts (26). Thus, no transition exists satisfying axioms 1, 3 and
2’.
8.2 Proofs and Extra Results on Choice Functions
8.2.1 More on Boundedness and Lipschitz continuity
The Boundedness axiom with ￿ ￿ 1 does imply Lipschitz continuity with parameter ￿. To

















































































































































, ￿ ￿ 1.
Now together with Anonymity we have that
pi (￿i;￿j;￿) ￿ pj (￿j;￿i;￿) = pi (￿i;￿j;￿) ￿ pi (￿j;￿i;￿):
implying Lipschitz continuity.
27